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# Democratic Practice after the Revolution: The Case of Portugal and Beyond

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**Robert M. Fishman<sup>1</sup>**

## **Abstract**

This article examines democratic practice after the revolution that brought an end to authoritarian dictatorship in Portugal in April 1974, taking the Portuguese case as an opportunity to theorize democratic practice and historical processes that shape its emergence. The argument stresses the distinctive features of democracy born in social revolution and the explanatory role of the partial inversion of social hierarchies and remaking of cultural repertoires in social revolutionary settings. The Portuguese case is compared to its larger neighbor, Spain, which moved from authoritarianism to democracy at roughly the same time following a process of change thoroughly unlike that of Portugal. Comparisons with other instances of postrevolutionary democracy and implications for more conventional democratic systems are also introduced. A central theme concerns the extent to which democracies attain the ideal of full political equality among citizens. This article asserts that democracies born in social revolution may approximate that ideal for reasons rooted in their historical pathways to representative government.

## **Keywords**

democratization, social revolution, democratic practice, Portugal, Spain

Social revolution is a relatively uncommon pathway to democracy, but I argue that this mode of democratization enables those representative systems that have such origins to approximate the goal of full political equality among citizens more than otherwise

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comparable polities. With an empirical focus on Portugal,<sup>1</sup> the first episode of the ultimately global “third wave,” I theorize characteristic features of democracy born in social revolution and of the historical processes involved. I argue for the distinctiveness of *democratic practice* forged in revolution and locate its roots in linkages between cultural, sociostructural, and political dimensions of regime change—borrowing from recent work on the interplay of these analytically distinct spheres in the making of societal outcomes.<sup>2</sup> This article offers a new perspective on the debate over enduring consequences of democratizing pathways;<sup>3</sup> it argues that the legacies of democratization scenarios take the form not of fixed states but instead of ongoing approaches to a wide range of political matters. Regime transitions hold the ability to change not only the basic rules linking governmental institutions to the broader populace, but also a variety of social practices and understandings.<sup>4</sup> In what follows I examine the historical substance of the Portuguese case as a means to specify and theorize mechanisms connecting the most thoroughly transformative pathway of regime change to an enduring form of democratic practice and a diverse set of societal outcomes.

Central to the issues examined here is a paradox that cuts to the heart of the democratic promise. Democracy rests on the principle of full political equality among citizens but the societies in which democracy is to be found—indeed all complex societies—are characterized by greater or lesser degrees of economic and social inequality. As Robert Dahl and other democratic theorists have observed, social and economic hierarchies of inequality pose difficulties for the ability of democracy to deliver fully on its promise of genuine political equality among citizens.<sup>5</sup> Social and economic hierarchies are especially likely to constrain the ability of citizens to share equally in agenda setting and in the informal dimensions of policy making. Insofar as the themes of debate taken up by political actors holding institutionalized power, and widely discussed in the public sphere, as well as the assumptions and extra-official sources of input influencing policy makers, reflect the interests and concerns of privileged strata—but not of the poor or other social and economic subordinates—the equal status of citizens at the ballot box is not translated into genuinely full political equality. This concern, emphasized in the scholarship on the *deepening* of democracy,<sup>6</sup> offers a useful theoretical backdrop for our analysis of political life after a revolution because a fundamental feature of contemporary Portuguese democratic practice—linked to its revolutionary origins—is the place it affords the protests of relatively poor and powerless actors in the setting of the country’s political agenda and in some policy-making processes.

My analysis places the Portuguese case in comparative perspective, emphasizing points of contrast with its larger Iberian neighbor, Spain,<sup>7</sup> while also identifying certain parallels with other postrevolutionary democracies such as France and, to one degree or another, two Central American cases.<sup>8</sup> The pathway Portugal followed to democracy stands in stark contrast to that of many other late-twentieth-century democratizers—including Spain—where reform-minded regime incumbents participated in crafting a largely consensual process of macropolitical transformation.<sup>9</sup> The paired comparison of Spain and Portugal is useful for posing the question of whether differing roads to democracy generate distinctive enduring collective outcomes, and if so, *how* they do

so.<sup>10</sup> Prior to the demise of authoritarianism through nearly polar opposite scenarios of change in the 1970s, these neighboring countries exhibited numerous structural similarities and historical parallels extending back several centuries. Both Portugal and Spain experienced periods of democratic rule in the early twentieth century, ending in the breakdown of those republics and the onset of decades of right-wing authoritarian rule. Early-twentieth-century democracy suffered from severe social conflict and political polarization in both countries, generating levels of political violence far higher than in the new democratic regimes that emerged in the 1970s.<sup>11</sup> Interaction between institutionalized power and discordant voices in the streets was frequently highly antagonistic—even violent—unlike the pattern of democratic practice predominating in contemporary Portugal, and journalistic practice in the early-twentieth-century republics was highly partisan—again fundamentally dissimilar from current Portuguese practice.<sup>12</sup>

Portugal's revolutionary road to democracy was initiated on April 25, 1974, when middle-ranking officers in the armed forces, organized in a clandestine movement of captains, launched a coup against the authoritarian *Estado Novo* and the colonial war in Africa.<sup>13</sup> Shortly after midnight, in a prearranged signal that the revolution was underway, members of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) used a commercial radio station to broadcast "Grandola"—an egalitarian folk song written by José Afonso and banned by the *Estado Novo*. After the MFA gained control of key broadcasting outlets and overcame resistance by a commander loyal to the existing regime (thanks to the crucial refusal of ordinary soldiers to follow orders to fire on the insurgents), crowds of jubilant citizens greeted the MFA in the streets, festively placing red carnations in the barrels of guns and tanks. By the time of the decisive confrontation later that day between revolutionary forces and the old guard defending incumbent dictator Marcello Caetano in a military barracks on Lisbon's Largo do Carmo, the boundaries between celebratory civilians and military rebels had begun to fray and Portugal's process of sociopolitical change had taken a form that would fundamentally transform not only politics but also social hierarchies and culture.

Social revolutions, including the Portuguese one, are complex multifaceted processes. Among their many characteristic features, I identify two as especially significant for the forging of a new democratic practice: (1) the *partial inversion of hierarchies* inside numerous social and political institutions and (2) the *reshaping of cultural repertoires and understandings*—as a result of (i) largely spontaneous actions taken in the context of social upheaval, (ii) the agenda formulated by emergent revolutionary powers, and (iii) the sheer intensity and accumulation of new collective experiences fundamentally different from what preceded them. As we shall see, these central features of social revolution strongly marked the Portuguese experience, and they did so in ways that wove together the challenge to existing social hierarchies and widespread cultural innovation—all made possible by the distinctive political configuration put in place by April 25 and its structural antecedents. The Portuguese events that began in 1974 offer much evidence on how democratic social revolutions shape enduring practice.

## Defining Democratic Practice

I use the term *democratic practice* to refer to the ways in which political actors—including ordinary citizens, groups that are organized or spontaneous, and institutional office holders—make use of the rights and possibilities for action provided by democracy and deal with others who are similarly engaged. The democratic practice of political actors encompasses their form of expression and interaction both within, and outside the bounds of, formal institutions. Although political life is powerfully shaped by institutional rules that specify—among other things—expected connections between power holders and other citizens, the actual practices constituting political life in a democracy can be more—or less—inclusive than formal institutional guidelines imply.

A country expresses its predominant form of democratic practice in numerous behaviors and outcomes, spanning the processes of opinion formation and agenda setting, public debate among recognized alternatives, the conduct of campaigns and elections, policy making itself, and the media coverage of all such endeavors. In all of these instances, the democratic practice of major institutionally powerful actors may be inclusionary and thematically expansive, exclusionary and thematically constrained, or somewhere in-between those two poles. The practice of poor and relatively powerless actors (as well as others located outside the recognized spaces of representative institutions) may focus on marginal—or disruptive—efforts to reshape outcomes in small and highly specific ways, or on politically more salient attempts to engage national power holders and public opinion writ large.<sup>14</sup> Democratic practice may join together, in one all-embracing conversation, a wide variety of voices—from those represented within institutions of government to those articulated in social movements in the streets—or it may limit the opportunities for voice by relatively powerless actors to the minimally required setting for citizens' equality: the ballot box.

This study examines ways in which the social revolutionary route to democracy has engendered a form of democratic practice in which relatively powerless or poor protesters and the holders of institutionalized political power address one another, participating jointly (along with others) in one national political “conversation.” As I develop below, Portugal's inclusionary democratic “conversation”—amply reported in the press and reflected in national policy-making outcomes—stands in contrast to the pattern found in the larger democracy just across the border that separates the Iberian Peninsula's two countries. I argue that democratic practice itself, and the cultural processes which underpin it, have the capacity to substantially enhance the goal of full political equality among citizens, not only in the Portuguese case but also elsewhere. This claim carries broad theoretical implications that extend well beyond the small universe of democracies rooted in social revolutionary processes.

## Contemporary Democratic Practice

On the morning of Tuesday January 24, 2006, more than three decades after the revolution, Portugal's three national television networks interrupted regular programming

to offer viewers live coverage of events taking place in the municipality of Amadora, outside Lisbon. A relatively small group of poor African immigrants and their supporters were resisting police efforts to evict them from dwellings slated for demolition. Just two days earlier these same networks had carried extensive coverage of a rather conventional political event, the election of a new president of the republic, but on that Tuesday morning the media focused on the words and actions of persons socially distant from the halls of power. The television reporters on the scene interviewed protesters on live television, offering them an opportunity to calmly, and at some length, explain the motivation for their resistance and the rights to which they appealed.<sup>15</sup> This was not the only opportunity for immigrants organized by *Solidariedade Imigrante* to gain an institutionally channeled audience for their evocation of the constitutional guarantee to the right to housing: several weeks later they organized a march on the Assembly of the Republic where they sought and received opportunities to meet with all of the legislative chamber's parliamentary groups; they subsequently have taken their case to municipal chambers, judicial bodies, and large national demonstrations organized around broader themes.<sup>16</sup>

I argue that events such as those described above—in which the voices of relatively powerless demonstrators are admitted to the mainstream national public sphere, and thus the political system's institutionally recognized conversation—constitute an emblematic feature of a type of democratic practice born in revolution, but typically absent from many democracies, such as Spain, that lack such beginnings.

Two crucial features of Portugal's postrevolutionary democratic practice are the openness of the communication media to the voices of relatively powerless protesters and the relative permeability of institutional power holders to their message and tactics. The voices and varied tactics of demonstrators are broadly accepted as normal components of politics, which merit attention. Perhaps as a result (and also as a direct legacy of revolutionary practice decades earlier), Portuguese protesters typically orient their efforts toward centers of political power and expect to achieve a hearing from power holders and the communications media. Spaniards are also highly prone to public protest, but their expressions of dissatisfaction are often consigned to a marginal space in public life, distant from the country's institutionally recognized arenas of debate. Spanish protesters and power holders appear at times to dwell within virtual parallel universes, or conversational spheres. The Portuguese revolution, in contrast, generated the basis for a broad and socially inclusive national conversation on politics, one that is relatively free from hierarchical barriers to meaningful entry.

Prominent Portuguese politicians manifest their democracy's predominant disposition toward the legitimacy and importance of protest in the streets. Mario Soares, former prime minister and president of the Republic, put the matter succinctly, insisting that, "In Portugal, the right to [popular] indignation exists" and—underscoring his sense that demonstrations form a legitimate part of political life—he added that during the struggles between Socialists and Communists in the aftermath of April 25, "we demonstrated in the streets, we won in the streets, not only in elections."<sup>17</sup> In a similar spirit, during his time serving as president of the Republic, Jorge Sampaio once explicitly called for "democratic agitation."<sup>18</sup>

An official exposition inaugurated in the Assembly of the Republic in April 2006 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Constitution conveyed the central place of demonstrations in the democratic worldview—the fundamental understanding of the nature of politics—held by mainline Portuguese politicians. The exposition on display in public spaces of the Assembly building as well as the extensive catalogue produced at the time showcased the constitutional text itself and included explanatory notes and visual images intended to transmit its underlying significance. The catalogue's pages are replete with images of protesters, most of them relatively powerless, and many of them denouncing one element or another of government policy. Small children protesting child labor, poor retirees denouncing their pensions as insufficient, students critiquing curricular reform or university tuition, gay rights activists demanding recognition of their family status, workers protesting privatization plans and government employment policies—all of these demonstrators earned a prominent place in the *official* celebration of the Portuguese Constitution.<sup>19</sup> Institutional power holders in this post-revolutionary democracy think of demonstrations as a fundamental and normal component of their political system.

The way the communications media treat protest activity, a point on which national cases vary, holds considerable significance for democratic practice. As Jeffrey Alexander notes in *The Civil Sphere*, “the fact that protest movements take place does not, in itself, guarantee that they will be represented publicly in the mass media, much less that they will be represented in a civil manner that elicits audience sympathy for the movement and possible identification with it.”<sup>20</sup> Thus, *how* the media report on protests carries major consequences for public life. Moreover, news media practice in fully reporting—or largely ignoring—the perspectives of protesters, is itself a reflection of dispositions, or authority relations, predominating within the media.<sup>21</sup> The legacies of revolution shape Portuguese public life under democracy not only through their direct impact on the practices of self-consciously political actors but also through their influence on the social relations and perspectives that characterize the news media and orient reporting practices.

Portuguese journalists are quite explicit in defending the principle that all citizens, including the relatively powerless, deserve to have their perspectives fairly reported in the national communications media. Estrela Serrano, a journalist and scholar, articulated this broadly shared commitment in a February 2003 newspaper column writing, “It is legitimate for the ‘common citizen’ to feel that the freedom of expression and right to information must involve, also, their own access to the media. In fact, on the balance and variety of voices expressed in the media depends, also the quality of democracy.”<sup>22</sup> Contemporary Portuguese journalistic practice strongly reflects this dual commitment to impartiality and inclusiveness, thus providing a robust space in the media for the concerns of socially subordinate and politically discordant actors.

Many Spanish journalists would also like to report the news in a way that incorporates poor and relatively powerless sectors—and protesters—into the mainstream of political activity accorded with sustained attention, but the control of news media outlets by directors pursuing a rather different philosophy has made such practice uncommon in

Spain. As Enric Bastardes, a veteran print journalist and leader of Spain's federation of (regional) journalistic unions, observed, "Demonstrations are of little interest [to most news executives]. If you don't value demonstrations the news coverage is reduced. The first that falls out [of the material reported to the public] are the declarations of the demonstrators."<sup>23</sup> Yet in Portugal such declarations are treated as newsworthy.

On the day in 2006 when I interviewed António Luis Marinho, Director of News and Information for Portugal's state-owned television and radio network, RTP, the nationwide morning television news opened with three stories. A leader of a small extreme-right party, under police investigation, was interviewed at length, an opportunity he used to present his perspective. A union of police officers engaged in an antigovernment demonstration was also featured, and later in the morning newscast small-town residents near Barcelos were shown protesting the government's failure to effectively prevent the spread of a forest fire that threatened their town. Portuguese television viewers had ample opportunity to hear a range of discontented voices on that morning—as they had on many other occasions.<sup>24</sup> When I asked Marinho about this succession of news stories featuring voices critical of the government, he replied that this was the normal approach for RTP and a reflection of the state-owned media outlet's commitment to civic impartiality.<sup>25</sup> RTP and the other two national networks in Portugal routinely report demonstrations of widely varying political stripes and offer demonstrators—including those with little power—opportunities to transmit their views.

Marinho attributed this policy to pressures from journalists themselves—committed to the norms of journalistic independence and civic neutrality—and from the society. In this news executive's view, legislative innovations that had been designed to guarantee the independence of state television had contributed to this approach to reporting, as had the example of one privately owned network, SIC, which shared a commitment to broad coverage of diverse perspectives. However, Marinho also stressed the commitment of journalists to reporting the news in the fashion consistently evident on Portuguese television. As he related, RTP journalists meet daily to discuss how to report the news.

Spanish state television, in contrast, has been much more heavily subject to governmental pressures on news content (at least until the overhaul of state television policy by the Zapatero government).<sup>26</sup> Perhaps the most patent instance of this pattern was manifested in the coverage of the March 11, 2004, terrorist attack in Madrid, just three days prior to national elections, when early official interpretations of the attack pointed erroneously toward the Basque movement (ETA), rather than toward al-Qaeda.<sup>27</sup> That extreme case of politically motivated distortion manifested underlying tendencies in Spanish state media to directly serve the interests of sitting governments. Spanish newspapers, as well, are routinely identified with a specific political perspective that is evident not only in their editorials but also in the reporting of the news. Civic impartiality, as Marinho and many other journalistic leaders have observed, has not been equally valued in the contemporary Spanish and Portuguese media.

José Manuel Fernandes, editor-in-chief of *Publico*, Portugal's premier newspaper of quality, also emphasized the importance of impartiality and inclusion in news coverage.<sup>28</sup> Crucially, Fernandes emphasized the historic role of the revolution in forging the ongoing

pattern of social relations and reporting within news organizations. During the revolutionary period reporters and typesetters had enjoyed the ability to challenge editorial policy and to criticize headlines or other components of the journalistic framing of news stories. In some reduced measure, Fernandes saw a continuing ability of reporters and other newspaper staffers to challenge authority—including his own as editor-in-chief. He attributed the news policy and the style of coverage in the newspaper he headed not only to his own preferences, but also to the paper's journalists and their ability to influence the way the news is reported.

Fernandes also indicated his desire to read and disseminate “views from out of the official world, *out of institutions*, views of common people” (emphasis added). He complained that “most journalists only speak to a small circle of powerful people [but] it is important to listen to people of little power.” He further noted that the newspaper's name, *Publico*, reflected in part the “idea not to be elitist.” Fernandes's political ideology on issues relating to economic policy had moved far from a classically left-oriented perspective in the years since revolution, but his conception of democratic practice, and of the journalistic practice of the newspaper he heads, continues to show the mark of the revolutionary path to democracy.

My interviews with Portuguese and Spanish journalists confirm the importance of historical legacies in the shaping of social relations within—and news coverage by—the information media. The directors of Portuguese media outlets are obliged to listen to concerns voiced by rank-and-file journalists, whereas Spanish media directors hold greater hierarchical powers. This difference—rooted in the two countries' pathways to democracy—is manifested in institutional structure and culturally rooted practices among journalists. Formal institutional differences do exist, such as elected journalistic councils (*conselhos de redacção*), which provide reporters with a consultative role in essentially all news outlets; these councils exist in Portugal but are relatively rare in Spain. However, these formal institutions cannot fully account for the national contrast in practice. The directors of Portuguese media outlets are formally entitled to set journalistic policy, whereas the role of the councils on such matters is legally established as advisory, however, that formal institutional setup provides a backdrop for informal practices in which journalists effectively share in establishing policies that guide news coverage. Practice in Portugal is even more robustly inclusionary than suggested by the design of formal institutions. In contrast, practice in Spain has lagged substantially behind formally available opportunities. Spanish journalists have underutilized the institutional powers they theoretically hold; in several cases they have allowed editorial councils to become dormant given the unwillingness of anyone to run for positions on these bodies. Spanish journalists have often been unable—or unwilling—to effectively challenge heavy handed tactics of their directors, who encourage them to politically manipulate news coverage in some newspapers and television stations. This occurs despite journalists' votes in workplace representational elections for unionists committed to enhanced autonomy for reporters.<sup>29</sup> Both cultural and formal institutional legacies of revolution—which permit relative subordinates, such as journalists, to resist pressures from their hierarchical superiors—help to explain why Portuguese news coverage is more impartial and inclusive of the voices of poor and powerless demonstrators.

News reporting plays an important role in the larger configuration of factors generating very different forms of democratic practice in the Iberian neighbors. News outlets contribute to Portugal's inclusive public sphere through their commitment to convey the voices of people "of little power" and their determination to resist power-centric pressures in reporting the news. But politicians and the broader public—including protesters—also contribute in important ways to the breadth and inclusionary spirit of the country's national conversation on politics. The willingness of protesters and politicians to address and acknowledge one another as relevant actors plays a central role—in stark contrast to Spain. The revolution's partial inversion of hierarchies has exerted a continuing influence in news coverage by affording journalists opportunities to challenge directives from above that might politically color their reporting and also by sensitizing the entire journalistic field to voices of the powerless.

As important work by Victor Sampedro shows, Spanish news coverage of protest movements—such as the pacifist *insumisos* who refused military conscription and environmentalists in the Galician *Nunca Mais* protest against governmental handling of a leaking oil tanker—has been quite sporadic, often focusing exclusively on the movements' disruptive impact rather than their political messages.<sup>30</sup> The politically engaged scholarship of Jaume Asens on the movement of the building-occupying *Okupas* in Barcelona reaches a similar conclusion.<sup>31</sup> Both the right-wing *Partido Popular* (PP)—which has, at times, refused to acknowledge the voices and numbers of demonstrating opponents<sup>32</sup>—and on occasion some sectors within the Socialist Party (PSOE) have manifested a hostility to protesters and a tendency to treat them as dangerous elements of destabilization. Within the PSOE, a virtual fault line has divided those who are open to the voices and critiques of protesters, from others who are more oriented toward order and state power than the principle of social inclusion.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps partly as a result, many Spanish protest groups focus their energies and voices away from institutionalized power rather than toward an engagement with power holders—a point reflected in recent work of anthropologist Jeff Juris and others.<sup>34</sup>

In Portugal, protesters not only seek, but often receive, hearings from institutional power holders. When Portuguese *Okupas* were expelled from a building they had occupied in Lisbon in August 2002, they complained to the press that this action represented a violation of an agreement they had previously reached with municipal authorities. The municipal authorities replied that they had made available a superior location for the *Okupas* to occupy.<sup>35</sup> Despite the breakdown of agreement in this case, even *Okupas* in Lisbon expect to reach understandings with the municipal government which, in turn, expected to deal with them. All of this stands in stark contrast with the hostile battles and lack of engagement between *Okupas* and municipal authorities in Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia and Spain's largest left-of-center city.<sup>36</sup>

Demonstrations over housing issues and their handling by public authorities offer some of the clearest evidence of the fundamental contrast between the two Iberian democracies. In both countries thousands of relatively poor people, many of them immigrants, live in formally illegal housing near the capital cities. In both cases many such houses have been demolished in recent years—under protest from the affected residents.

Yet despite this rough similarity of circumstance, the political handling of the events and of the persons involved has been different.

In 2008 authorities in Madrid-area municipalities with territory inside the *Cañada Real*, a large expanse of formally illegal housing, declined to engage in dialogue with the residents of dwellings slated for demolition. Javier Baeza, a left-oriented parish priest in southern Madrid, and other supporters of the *Cañada Real* residents, were frustrated in their efforts to initiate such dialogue and to arrange adequate replacement housing for residents faced with the loss of their dwellings. Suffering from the lack of governmental action on their behalf, a group of immigrant families evicted from buildings in *Cañada Real* lived for more than a month inside the church in southern Madrid, ministered to by priest Javier Baeza.<sup>37</sup> In contrast, at roughly the same time in Lisbon the Portuguese government's chief housing official, Joao Ferrao, launched a program of negotiations with residents of illegal housing in Amadora, just outside the capital city, in search of a comprehensive solution to the status of their dwellings.<sup>38</sup> In another recent case, residents of houses occupied during the revolution in the neighborhood of Amendoeiras engaged in a multiyear campaign of protest to demand the rescinding of a measure that had awarded ownership of their homes to a private entity. Their protests, and conversations with all parliamentary groups, left to right, in Portugal's Assembly of the Republic led to a resolution in their favor, unanimously passed by the representative body.<sup>39</sup> Joao Ferrao negotiated with these residents, and—in dialogue with them—stitched together a government plan to return the homes first to public ownership and ultimately to the residents themselves.

The cross-national contrast in the permeability of officialdom to popular pressure on housing issues is matched by an equivalent divergence in the approach taken by protesters. Residents of disputed dwellings in Amadora and Amendoeiras and the broader Portuguese movement for *O Direito a Habitação* (the right to housing) focused their protest activities on governmental institutions in the hope of winning significant concessions. However, the quite visible Spanish protest movement *V de Vivienda*, which mobilized support for affordable housing in 2006 and 2007, centered its campaign on public opinion, and participants in the movement expressed reluctance to engage in sustained dialogue with elected authorities.<sup>40</sup> This large difference between housing movements in the two cases reflects, in large measure, two very different sets of understandings about what political life organized around elective institutions can accomplish. Housing movement participants in Portugal tell themselves, often with enthusiasm, that change *is* possible, that they can shift the country's political agenda. At times they articulate explicit connections between their struggles and the principles—or memories—of the revolution of the carnations.<sup>41</sup> Housing-oriented and neighborhood movements also played a role in the social pressure and politics of the Spanish transition, as the classic work of Castells has emphasized. But even at the time of those historically important movements, one of the cases examined by Castells produced little or no impact on policy makers and none of the movements produced changes as abrupt and deep as those in Portugal.<sup>42</sup> The macro-level disparity between the two Iberian pathways to democracy has generated an enduring contrast in the place of urban movements in contemporary democratic practice.

## The Impact of Democratic Practice on Societal Outcomes

Democratic practice, with its roots in the historical processes analyzed below, has influenced a wide range of outcomes, helping to account for various points of contrast between the Iberian cases.<sup>43</sup> I turn now to three societal outcomes: (1) employment and the labor market, (2) individual-level cultural consumption, and (3) housing. Despite their obvious differences, these three arenas combine to provide the social scientist with readily quantifiable dependent variables.

Perhaps the starkest divergence between the Iberian cases lies in the area of the labor market. A great deal of empirical evidence supports the claim—presented elsewhere—that the pathways to democracy of Portugal and Spain helped to produce the substantial disparity between the two countries in employment levels. The Iberian employment puzzle, of chronically higher unemployment in Spain than Portugal, has attracted the attention of scholars in several social science disciplines; I argue that (through several mediating mechanisms) its origins lie in the highly dissimilar democratizing scenarios and forms of democratic practice emphasized here.<sup>44</sup> Portugal's revolution quickly and dramatically generated increased women's participation in the labor force—thus offering the second-order job creation benefits of female employment identified by Esping-Andersen in his analysis of postindustrial economies.<sup>45</sup> Yet even more importantly, the dynamics emphasized in this article favored the development in Portugal of an epistemic community of policy makers—and professional economists on whom they have relied—highly oriented toward neo-Keynesian approaches, in direct contrast to the predominance of monetarist and neoclassical policy approaches in Spain.

The relative openness of Portuguese policy elites to pressures from below encouraged their turn to prominent neo-Keynesians for policy advice on identifying ways in which state action could enhance employment. Portuguese labor-market policies have included a variety of public initiatives that promote the financing and development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Whereas the Spanish financial system has provided a relatively low level of financing to SMEs, the Portuguese banking system—in which the largest single institution is state-owned—has offered a high level of financing to such firms, with major benefits for the aggregate level of employment. Portuguese policy makers have at times changed policies, but they have consistently attempted to stimulate employment through state initiatives. The democratic practice forged in the social revolutionary pathway to democracy has encouraged them to actively search for pro-employment correctives to market processes.

Cultural consumption patterns documented by survey data provide another example of divergence. As recent work by Fishman and Lizardo has shown, the relative prevalence of musical “omnivores,” who regularly consume multiple musical genres, provides strong evidence of effects induced by the contrasting scenarios of macropolitical change.<sup>46</sup> The cohorts of Spaniards and Portuguese socialized under authoritarianism manifest virtually identical (and similarly low) tendencies toward the omnivorous embrace of multiple musical genres, whereas among those socialized during the two democratization episodes, Portuguese are more omnivorous than Spanish. And

among those born under democracy the cross-national difference is even greater. Young Portuguese, born and socialized in a postrevolutionary democracy, exhibit a level of omnivorous musical consumption similar to that found in the successful and relatively egalitarian societies of northern Europe, whereas young Spaniards are more inclined to prefer only one genre.

This pattern of variation, in turn, reflects cross-national contrasts in educational practice. Teacher practice has been marked by nonhierarchical forms of student-centered learning and cultural activation in Portugal,<sup>47</sup> whereas educational reform efforts in Spain more heavily emphasize the (admittedly) crucial question of distributional access rather than cultural content and educator practice. Even when legislative reforms of socialist governments in Spain *did* promote student-centered approaches, actual practice lagged behind those policy intentions and the teacher–student relationship was marked by hierarchical understandings.<sup>48</sup> Portugal's success in activating omnivorous cultural consumption among young people born under democracy is rooted in educational practice that emerged in the hierarchy-challenging experience of social revolution and was sustained by the country's ongoing democratic practice.

The development of housing policy—a terrain strongly linked to the social protest/power holder nexus emphasized by this article—also manifests a pattern of contrast between the cases. This article's examination of democratic practice showed how specific episodes of housing-related protest generated dialogue and policy responses from power holders in Portugal, but not to the same degree in Spain. Yet to what extent is that episodic outcome manifested in the broader outlines of policy?

Although both countries are characterized by relatively high levels of private home ownership and low levels of renting, that pattern is substantially more accentuated in Spain. In Portugal, a large proportion of the housing stock in the two historic cities, Lisbon and Oporto, is dedicated to low-rent publicly owned units. That the concerns of low-income renters are incorporated within policy making is also reflected by the fact that Portugal's national renters' association played a decisive role in negotiating a recent reform of rent-control legislation and related matters.<sup>49</sup> In Spain, as José Adelantado and Ricard Gomà have shown, housing policy under governments of both the center-left and the center-right has been more geared toward the objectives of promoting private ownership and construction than addressing social pressure from below or the need for low-rent options.<sup>50</sup> These scholars note that, as a result, at the end of the 1990s Spain had the highest level of private home ownership but the lowest level of renting and of public expenditure on housing among EU member states.<sup>51</sup>

Thus the postrevolutionary democratic practice outlined and theorized here generates a variety of quite diverse effects. The examples briefly introduced in this discussion serve to illustrate the wide thematic range of such outcomes. Yet this does not mean that postrevolutionary democracies such as Portugal achieve deeply egalitarian outcomes in all terrains. That would be a serious overstatement of the available evidence; Portuguese society is characterized by major enduring inequalities. Moreover, Spain has had its significant triumphs in the realms of culture, economics, and politics including the basic success of democratic consolidation. Still, the routine conduct of democratic

political life in Portugal provides a voice to poor and relatively powerless actors in ways that generate many outcomes that contrast with those found in neighboring Spain.

Which features of Portugal's social revolutionary pathway to democracy can account for this pattern? And which mechanisms have sustained the form of democratic practice rooted in revolution, decades after the events of the 1970s? Before specifying the features of Portugal's pathway to democracy that hold explanatory relevance for the outcomes outlined above, I first elaborate the mechanisms to which I attribute the endurance of a distinctly postrevolutionary form of democratic politics.

## Mechanisms Sustaining Postrevolutionary Practice

This article's argument is not intended to suggest that all the characteristics of democratization scenarios live on perpetually through a culturally rooted guarantee of continuity. The eclipse of consensus in post-transition Spain is one important case in point.<sup>52</sup> Nonetheless, I do argue that the cultural sphere has contributed significantly to the persistence of a form of democratic practice born in revolution. Cultural repertoires, structures, and practices have a tendency to reproduce themselves—all else remaining equal—and some cultural phenomena are more robustly durable than others. The cultural changes elicited by social revolution are almost certainly more causally significant for latter-day political life than the changes in meaning, expressive form, and practice that emerge from more routine chapters of political change. In the case examined here, the powerful synergy of implicit and explicit cultural change, articulated around transformations in social hierarchies in the wake of Portugal's April 25, generated a democratic *habitus* capable of sustaining a recognizably postrevolutionary form of sociopolitical practice. Efforts to reproduce that form of practice, through commemorations of the revolution and other initiatives analyzed below, have played an important role in this dynamic.

Following a large body of work in sociology, I understand repertoires of practice to hold a certain coherence and sustainability reflective of the culturally rooted understandings or dispositions predominating within large social contexts such as national cases (or subcultures).<sup>53</sup> From this perspective, it is the culturally constituted and transmitted understandings of democracy that provide the logic generative of the practices I emphasize. It is useful to think of these underpinnings as including what has been called *implicit culture*, which is based on experience and leading to relatively unarticulated expectations, and *explicit culture*, which is manifested in discourse and other forms of public expression such as the commemorative activities discussed below.<sup>54</sup> As Lizardo and Strand argue, the coherence of practice rests precisely on synergies between implicit understandings or expectations and explicit culture—with its highly visible symbols and often elaborate forms of expression, justification, and argumentation—as well as other institutional forms.<sup>55</sup> In this view, custom and habit have some tendency to persist; and when they work in synergy with explicit culture articulated around narratives, discourses, and nationally recognized symbols—as in postrevolutionary Portugal—that tendency is enhanced. I assume that such culturally

rooted practice, and the more readily observable institutional design on which vast literatures usefully focus, together shape tangible political behaviors. However, Portugal's postrevolutionary democratic practice is even more inclusive than is required by the makeup of formal institutions, whereas in Spain, the reverse is the case. This pattern cannot be explained without returning to the cultural legacies of democratization.

What is distinctive about social revolution is its ability to quickly and fundamentally reshape explicit cultural structures and symbols as well as experiences—which is to say concrete practices.<sup>56</sup> The explicit and implicit cultural legacies of revolution—with their linkage to symbols and discourses as well as tacit understandings about practice—are all developed in a context conditioned by the redefinition of hierarchies and institutions. The synergies between implicit and explicit postrevolutionary culture, which I argue for in Portugal, represent a “package” that has been capable of sustaining the democratic practice born in revolution. The explanation for the emergence of this pattern is to be found in the historical processes analyzed below.

## Crucial Features of the Iberian Democratization Scenarios

A series of crucial differences between the Portuguese and Spanish pathways to democracy follows from one central point of contrast in the structural underpinning of transformation: whereas *regime* reformists launched Spain's democratic transition (under pressure from, and often in negotiation with, the democratic opposition), following the death of Francisco Franco in November 1975, it was *state* actors, unrelated to the political apparatus of the authoritarian regime, who initiated Portugal's comprehensive transformation in April 1974.<sup>57</sup> This central point of contrast gave way to a larger set of fundamental differences in the two democratization scenarios and provided the basis for an enduring divergence between the neighboring countries in democratic practice. I elaborate below on the significance of several such factors including state crisis, the partial inversion of hierarchies, widespread purges, and the political salience of public protests. I take up the cultural dynamics of the revolutionary path to democracy in a separate section.

The relatively antihierarchical character of Portugal's 1974 democratizing coup, led by middle-level army officers, and the thoroughgoing politicization of the military in the months that followed, contributed to a state crisis and opened the door to relatively unrestrained demand making and cultural expression by sectors of society that had long been constrained by authoritarian repression. The crucial factor that underpinned the emergence of state crisis, and provided the direct motivation for the captains' rebellion, was the colonial war being fought—and lost—by the existing regime. The Portuguese case unmistakably follows the scenario for social revolution formulated by Skocpol's classic *States and Social Revolutions*.<sup>58</sup> State crisis made the country's social revolution possible, as much careful research has demonstrated. Bermeo's pioneering work on land seizures by agricultural workers in the Alentejo,<sup>59</sup> Hammond's work on urban housing movements,<sup>60</sup> Durán's comparison of urban worker protest in the

two Iberian regime transitions,<sup>61</sup> as well as Palacios's examination of post-April 25 popular mobilizations,<sup>62</sup> all show the central role that the eclipse of the state's coercive powers played in enabling social mobilization to take a revolutionary turn. In contrast, the continuity of state power in the context of democratic transition in Spain (and numerous other national cases) allowed governments to restrain mobilizations that represented a fundamental challenge to the legal and social orders.

A defining feature of the Portuguese path to democracy was the partial inversion of preexisting hierarchies, first within the military itself, soon within other state institutions, and subsequently within a variety of social institutions and contexts. The rebellion within the armed forces fundamentally challenged institutional discipline, requiring the explicit refusal of captains and others to obey commands of their erstwhile hierarchical superiors. That initial challenge to hierarchy quickly deepened and spread. In the year and a half following April 25, the growing—yet only partial—inversion of hierarchies reshaped Portuguese institutions and culture in multiple ways and contexts, with—I argue—significant consequences for enduring democratic practice.

This widespread challenge to hierarchies constitutes a phenomenon of broad theoretical significance and comparative reach: social revolutions, by their very nature, entail at least some inversion of existing social and political hierarchies, and thus they hold considerable equality-enhancing properties. Social revolutions allow previously subordinate actors to intervene decisively in national politics, and frequently in more micro-social environments as well, thus creating conditions for a degree of equality among the citizenry that much democratic theory insists upon but few democracies fully attain. Obviously, such processes may fail to guarantee other constitutive features of democracy, but where social revolutions end in democracy, as in Portugal, their fundamental challenge to hierarchy creates a solid basis for pursuing the democratic objective of political equality among citizens. This effect is reinforced by its interrelationship with an analytically distinct feature of social revolution, the forging of new cultural symbols, discourses, and practices—a theme to be discussed below. Indeed, the defense of disobedience has become a constitutive feature of how the contemporary democracy celebrates its origins in revolution.<sup>63</sup>

Workers with relatively similar life circumstances (notwithstanding the somewhat higher living standards in Spain at the time) and highly similar demands played fundamentally different roles in the two national processes of change. In Portugal, workers' initiatives led to the nationalization of numerous enterprises and the country's entire domestic banking system; meanwhile, urban movements occupied empty dwellings and a variety of other forms of mobilization substantially remade Portuguese society and institutions. The Constitution, which was approved by a constituent assembly elected on April 25, 1975 (precisely one year after the revolution of the carnations), defined the new democracy as a state engaged in constructing socialism and imposed restraints on re-privatization of nationalized firms.<sup>64</sup> In the analysis of social and legal theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the Portuguese state at the time was not to be understood as a capitalist state or a welfare state.<sup>65</sup>

In Spain, workers managed to win substantial wage increases in the first years following the November 1975 death of Francisco Franco; however, as the democratic transition moved forward, labor adopted a policy of restraint in wage demands, participating in a broader national effort to build a relatively consensual basis for constructing democracy.<sup>66</sup> The cross-national contrast in the immediate context of democratization is clear, but the question requiring attention is how important consequences of the Portuguese revolution could survive the eventual undoing of the initial nationalizations and the most left-oriented features of the Constitution, following the late-1980s agreement of the center-right *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD) and the center-left *Partido Socialista* (PS) to re-privatize the previous decade's nationalizations.<sup>67</sup> I argue that the key to answering that question lies in this article's emphasis on the ongoing practice of politics and its ability to shape developments relatively distant in historical time from the revolution itself.

Differences between the Iberian democratization scenarios emerged on many terrains other than that of enterprise ownership—including the relatively massive purges of authoritarian loyalists that occurred in Portugal but not in Spain. The Portuguese purges, studied by political scientist António Costa Pinto, began in the armed forces, quickly diffused to the old regime's political police, then to some government ministries, and ultimately numerous private enterprises.<sup>68</sup> Educational institutions and the communications media were also significantly reshaped by efforts to purge them of loyalists to the old order. Costa Pinto cites official estimates of February 1975—on the eve of the most radical revolutionary phase extending from March through November of that year—that placed at roughly 12,000 the number of individuals already removed from their positions.<sup>69</sup> The efforts to remake state institutions, and some (previously) private ones, included both legally sanctioned “top-down” and extra-legal “bottom-up” initiatives. Such bottom-up actions, reflective of the revolution's partial inversion of hierarchies, are manifested in the experiences of educational institutions, related by Costa Pinto: “Students would simply deny some professors entry to the university following assembly votes, although only a small minority of those ‘condemned’ were ever subjected to legal purge proceedings by the purge commission of the Ministry of Education. The same applied to some schoolteachers suspected of collaborating with the political police.”<sup>70</sup>

Crucially, both informally mobilized citizens and legally constituted revolutionary authorities participated in the relatively extensive effort to remove supporters of the authoritarian past from positions of responsibility. This combination holds considerable theoretical importance for how we understand the impact of revolutionary processes on the forging of new forms of political practice. The bottom-up initiatives generated intense collective experiences for their participants and a remaking of institutional spaces in a way that changed *implicit culture*. Portuguese scholar of education David Rodrigues has noted, “There is an ethos of April 25 even among conservatives. In the internal functioning of the school a lot of these values are present—if somewhat implicit.”<sup>71</sup> As anthropologist José Sobral observes in recollections of the purges that took place inside the university, “It was the whole world turned upside down.” Even

when those purged for their conservative politics ultimately returned, “they returned to a different world.”<sup>72</sup>

The political significance of crowds in the streets—and the tendency of institutional power holders to pay them heed—cannot be escaped in analyzing the Portuguese case. Demonstrators and others engaged in bottom-up mobilizations helped to set the backdrop for all sorts of decisions—from the emerging institutional design of the new system to rather concrete and immediate policy-making acts. The impact of demonstrators in the streets is abundantly clear in the decisions and commentaries of economists that held high government responsibilities during the crucial early years of Portugal’s postauthoritarian transformation. In a recently published collection of in-depth journalistic interviews with major economic policy makers, Mário Murteira, a left-oriented economist who served as minister in three governments of the revolutionary period, remarks, “Several times when I was engaged in important conversations with [Prime Minister] Vasco Gonçalves, in his office, we would go to the window to see those who were passing by in demonstrations. *In the end and to a great extent we were more spectators in a grand popular movement than actors*” (emphasis added).<sup>73</sup> Although many economic decisions made by Murteira and others at the time have been subsequently rethought and modified,<sup>74</sup> the trip to the windows that he recalls has remained part of the approach to politics followed by many Portuguese political leaders. It was during the revolutionary period that mass mobilization in the streets came to occupy an important place in the repertoire of political action deployed by forces on the left, right, and center.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, the tendency of many such protests to end in front of the Assembly of the Republic or government ministries, thus establishing official institutions as a primary audience for protest, dates from the revolutionary period. Demonstrators and institutional power holders have taken heed of one another since the democracy’s revolutionary beginnings.

Spaniards, like their Portuguese counterparts, often went into the streets to demonstrate during the transition years; their country’s transformation—as well as its continuing mode of democratic practice—cannot be understood without ample reference to popular expressions of protest. Nonetheless, the permeability of policy makers to such protest was far less pronounced in the Spanish case. Moreover, Spanish protesters could not push many of their demands as far as they wished for reasons mentioned earlier. Emblematic of this pattern is the explicit prohibition on demonstrating immediately in front of the Spanish Parliament, the *Congreso de los Diputados*, in Madrid. A wide range of Spanish politicians, including prominent members of the center-left Socialist Party (PSOE), have explicitly argued that permitting demonstrators onto the steps of Parliament would inappropriately and dangerously expose the parliament to uninstitutionalized pressures.<sup>76</sup>

Whereas the greatest domestic pressures on decision makers in Portugal, apart from those emanating directly from the electoral arena, came from previously subordinate actors, pressures in Spain also came from incumbent elites. The most decisively important action of reformist Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez in the run-up to Spain’s first democratic elections since the 1930s was his April 1977 surprise legalization of the

Communist Party, an act that broke symbolically with the Francoist past, enhancing the credibility of the June 1977 elections.<sup>77</sup> In that decision by Suárez, the most significant perceived offstage actor was the Spanish military, not demonstrators. Suárez timed the decision to coincide with a moment of temporary operational incapacity on the part of a key armored division whose possible intervention he had feared.

Admittedly, the crowds in the streets and the partial inversion of hierarchies in Portugal were not sufficient, in and of themselves, to guarantee a democratic outcome. All democracies must locate ultimate decisional authority within legally constituted institutions based on the freely expressed will of the citizens, institutions that guarantee political rights to those in disagreement with power holders.<sup>78</sup> Protests in the streets and a partial inversion of hierarchies cannot eclipse the indispensability of that democratic requirement or of the associated requisite of free and competitive elections. Actors in the Portuguese case—including the electorate—achieved such an outcome, building representative institutions rooted in a social revolutionary context.<sup>79</sup> But the new institutions were to be used by actors whose practice has been shaped by cultural dynamics initiated in social revolution, the theme to which we now turn.

## Cultural Processes and the Commemoration of April

From the revolution's onset on April 25 in song and military rebellion,<sup>80</sup> with the arrival in public squares of tanks and flowers, the Portuguese road to democracy was unmistakably marked by an intertwining of politics and culture, conditioned by the transformation of state structures and social hierarchies. In overthrowing the old authoritarian order, the Portuguese created new (and enduring) symbols, forms of expression, and practices—such as commemoration itself<sup>81</sup>—that have enlivened and shaped the country's life under democracy. Just as Lynn Hunt has classically shown for France's great revolution,<sup>82</sup> in Portugal, much of the new energy unleashed by revolution focused on rethinking and transmitting to a growing audience the meaning of the country's collective life, identifying and celebrating the endeavors and principles that merit allegiance and dedication. This is not to say that culture took causal priority over politics itself or that one can always isolate the one from the other in empirical reality, but rather that the analytical distinction between cultural and political dynamics must be recognized if one is to make sense of the revolution and its enduring impact.<sup>83</sup>

The revolution's cultural manifestations included both spontaneous bottom-up initiatives and top-down strategies elaborated by the MFA and other revolutionary powers. On the thirtieth anniversary of the revolution in 2004, Lisbon's old establishment newspaper, *Diário de Notícias*, published a volume celebrating April's political posters. As this publication observed, with the country's sudden liberation from the fear of police repression in 1974, "the most varied forms of art, in many cases of a spontaneous nature, made their appearance in Portugal's cities, towns and countryside, trying to express a new way of living . . . the future which could be constructed. The plastic arts were among the most widely used. 'Song is a weapon' assured the lyrics of a musical creation."<sup>84</sup>

Filmmakers took to the streets on April 25, and then quickly rearranged the official institutions responsible for shaping the country's film industry.<sup>85</sup>

The linkage of politics and culture was quite explicit. A poster produced in June 1974 by the Democratic Movement of Plastic Artists celebrated "Flowers, Freedom, Fire, Imagination, Force, Unity, Art, Revolution" beneath the image of two carnations, one red and one white.<sup>86</sup> A 1974 poster produced by Sergio Guimaraes depicted a barefoot young girl happily placing a red carnation in the barrel of a soldier's gun.<sup>87</sup> The elaboration of new symbols and forms of expression constituted much of the substance of what went on in Portugal in the months and years after April 25, 1974.

During the year and a half of revolutionary effervescence following April 1974, the MFA itself attempted to weave together the revolution's political and cultural aspirations for change. The officially supported program of "cultural dynamization" sought to change the civic and cultural dispositions of citizens living in small towns and rural areas in the country's conservative North. With the participation of artists, musicians, authors, and activists—alongside soldiers loyal to the revolutionary MFA—the campaign reached numerous small towns, touching the sensibilities of some (but not other) local residents and building powerful memories among the campaign's participants.<sup>88</sup> The cultural dynamization initiative was ultimately abandoned when moderates defeated radicals in November 1975, but it did not stand alone in the revolutionary powers' repertoire of self-consciously cultural endeavors. The post-April 25 effort to transform education explicitly incorporated such endeavors, as was reflected by a fall 1974 publication of the MFA, which declared, "We have to win the cultural battle, which is not only what the books teach. The schools [must] go out to the streets and the streets [must] go into the schools, through musical bands, folklore, orchestras, songs, dances, poetry, theater, the circus, the cinema, artisanry, and the plastic arts."<sup>89</sup> Although the intensity of early efforts to transform culture waned after the fall of 1975, the revolution's cultural side was not to be contained historically within the initial year and half of radical ascendancy.

Thirty years after the revolution, on the evening of April 23, 2004, groups of immigrants from several continents gathered on Lisbon's Largo do Carmo where authoritarian ruler Marcello Caetano surrendered to revolutionary forces in 1974. This celebration of events that had transpired three decades earlier had been organized by associations of newcomers to Portugal, most of whom arrived after the carnation revolution. They ate, drank, listened to music of various types, and conversed for hours. Vendor stands offered those present political and historical literature as well as food and drink. Shortly after midnight the crowd joined in singing "Grandola." The organizers of the 2004 event then unveiled a large birthday cake, which read, "April 25, 30 years old." They invited young children on stage and together the crowd sang "happy birthday" to April 25. The next evening the same plaza, the revolution's symbolically central Largo do Carmo, was occupied by the youth group of the PSD, Portugal's principal center-right party; their goal, as well, was to celebrate the anniversary of April 25. These two commemorative acts took their place on a long, virtually countless, list of acts held throughout the country to mark the anniversary.

The Portuguese regularly dedicate enormous energies to planning and carrying out a diverse set of commemorative activities. Each year on April 25, a special nationally televised session of Parliament is held for the purpose of honoring the day, its meaning and its heroes. The president of the Republic and representatives of all parliamentary parties offer remarks on the events of April, their continuing legacy, and ongoing challenges faced by Portuguese democracy. This act holds greatest significance for those on the political left: Socialists (PS) and members of the two parties to their left, the social movement-oriented *Bloco de Esquerda* (BE) and the Communists (PCP), wear red carnations, and speakers from the PCP and the BE typically make use of the occasion to recall the ambitious social agenda of the revolutionary period. Yet the official commemoration also holds meaning for many to the right of the Portuguese center. The principal center-right party, the PSD, joins in celebrating the spirit of the revolution. In the 2004 commemorative session it was the PSD's designated speaker, Victor Cruz, who underscored the continuing cultural resonance of events thirty years earlier by remarking, "Never was politics so close to poetry as in April."<sup>90</sup>

A relatively nonhierarchical conception of democracy, rooted in revolution—and its implicit message that persistent forms of domination can be overcome—also takes its place in commemorative declarations made in Parliament and other communicative endeavors. In his speech during the official 2008 parliamentary session on April 25, Bloco de Esquerda deputy José Soeiro asserted, "Democracy is the strongest answer against all forms of domination—in the space of enterprises, schools, families, sexuality. . . . [I]f there is one thing that April 25 teaches us it is that it is always possible to change everything."<sup>91</sup> The *collective imaginary* appealed to by many Portuguese,<sup>92</sup> including, quite obviously, those who feel closest to the revolution's legacy, is marked by the sense that protests against domination can succeed—a point that holds considerable significance for contemporary democratic practice.

Outside Parliament, countless other commemorative acts are organized in municipal chambers, city squares and parks, concert halls, and city streets. Elected officials and institutions, as well as political parties and civil society associations, organize such undertakings. The extraordinary number of events involved, and the magnitude of the collective energies required to make it all happen, are reflected in a 754-page volume published in 1996 that lists all the commemorative activities that took place two years earlier on the revolution's twentieth anniversary.<sup>93</sup> The April 25 Association, founded by veteran captains of the MFA, holds an annual street demonstration in Lisbon in which political parties and activists of the left participate alongside residents of small towns wearing traditional folk outfits that implicitly assert the linkage of April 25 to some sense of the country's "national essence."<sup>94</sup> Numerous marchers in this annual demonstration carry red carnations and some among them later deposit the flowers on the Largo do Carmo, in honor of those who secured Caetano's surrender.

The messages and meanings conveyed in this massive commemorative enterprise are rather diverse but not, for that reason, without significance. For many, the occasion offers an opportunity to articulate an expansive and robust understanding of democratic practice. That activists on the political left make use of the anniversary to celebrate

a socially expansive understanding of democracy is unsurprising. Yet the salience of revolutionary values for defining contemporary democratic practice is not limited to the political left. On the anniversary in 2007 it was a municipal leader of the center-right PSD in Maia, a town north of Oporto, who remarked, “To exercise citizenship is to fulfill April.” He continued, insisting, “Democracy only really exists when it assures everyone, without exception, the possibility to exercise in absolute fullness, their rights and duties . . . for me, the best way to commemorate and respect the spirit of April 25 is creating mechanisms to consolidate a truly participatory democracy.”<sup>95</sup> Active citizen participation is one of many themes manifested in April 25 remarks; others include the search for social justice, resistance to domination, freedom itself, and—as suggested earlier by the remarks of Victor Cruz in the Assembly of the Republic—poetry.

Commemorations, and the broader ongoing efforts to remember Portugal’s path to democracy, heavily emphasize the goal of teaching the revolution’s significance to children born after the historically decisive events beginning in April 1974. The thirtieth anniversary’s planned activities in Lisbon included the commissioning of adolescents to paint a giant commemorative mural in the city’s center. Several recently published books—such as the instructional text designed by a team under the direction of social and legal theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos and intended for use in the public school system<sup>96</sup>—offer suggestions on how to tell the story of April 25 in schools and other settings.

Public opinion data provide evidence that this effort has been largely successful. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary, a large national survey—supervised by political scientists Pedro Magalhaes and António Costa Pinto—indicated that a clear majority of Portuguese people considered April 25 to be the most significant date in their nation’s history, vastly outdistancing other important dates offered to the respondents.<sup>97</sup> Remarkably, the population segment most strongly inclined to embrace this strongly positive view of the carnation revolution was that of young people, born under democracy. The impact of the revolution is manifested not only in its direct effect on those who experienced it, but also in its indirect cultural influence on those who were born (or immigrated) later.

Spaniards, needless to say, also speak and write of their past,<sup>98</sup> but no modern political event plays a comparable role in their country’s collective efforts to positively define itself. Spain’s post-Franco democratic transition provides two somewhat commemorable dates: June 15, 1977, when the first democratic elections after the 1930s took place and December 6, 1978, when the democratic Constitution was approved in referendum. The second of these dates, December 6, is an official holiday but in practice its significance is essentially limited to the legally established day of vacation time. June 15 has provided the occasion for the nation’s political elite to hold periodic tributes in Parliament to the 1970s regime transition, but the event lacks the regular annual character as well as the national television audience of its Portuguese counterpart, and it stands alone on that day—without any echo in acts and celebrations outside the halls of national power. The memory of Spain’s transition lacks the cultural force of Portugal’s collective commemoration of April 25. In the analysis of cultural sociologist

Laura Desfor Edles, “the effervescence of the core symbols [of the Spanish transition] receded” after the new Constitution was approved in 1978.<sup>99</sup>

One potential objection deserves our attention: is it possible that the most salient influence on contemporary Spanish collective life is the memory of the Civil War, and not the path taken from authoritarianism to democracy in the 1970s? Indeed, the historical memory that most powerfully shapes Spanish politics appears not to be that of the democratic transition but instead that of the Civil War, which bitterly divided Spaniards from 1936 to 1939. The Civil War represents for the transition, and the resulting configuration of the post-Franco democratic system, what Slater and Simmons have called a “critical antecedent” that must be taken into account if we are to understand the dynamics of a critical juncture<sup>100</sup>—in this instance, the transition from the Franco regime to democracy—decades later. But I argue that the Civil War’s memory—and the pressure toward moderation associated with that collective recollection—not only shaped, but was also shaped by, the dynamics of a transition from authoritarian rule under challenging circumstances: Democratic forces in Spain had no broadly acknowledged crisis of regime failure to which they could appeal to undermine remaining support for authoritarian rule; they confronted the need to undercut Franco’s legitimacy formula based (for regime supporters) on the Civil War and the polarization which preceded it. For actors promoting democratization, demonstrating that the country had overcome the divisions of the past constituted a way to make the argument that authoritarianism suffered from a *crisis of obsolescence*.<sup>101</sup>

The important work of Paloma Aguilar can be read as making the case for the independent impact of collective memory of the Civil War on the post-Franco regime change, but her analysis also shows that carefully constructed memories and interpretations of the war developed and were elaborated in the years leading to the democratic transition—and were put to political use by actors, sometimes to weaken their adversaries.<sup>102</sup> The transition, through its distinctive political challenges and dynamics, contributed to shaping the construction and use of Civil War narratives. In the intertwining of politics and culture, strictly political dynamics shaped cultural developments, just as the reverse was also true.

Thus both the revolutionary pathway of Portugal and the consensus-oriented transition of Spain influenced how the societies constructed understandings of their past and engaged in other cultural endeavors. The revolutionary removal of restraints on expression and demand-making in one case—experiencing state crisis and the partial inversion of hierarchies—contrasted with the politically rooted moderation in demand-making, and some forms of expression, in the neighboring case. Cultural repertoires, including narratives about the past, were strongly shaped by the political dynamics of the road from authoritarianism to democracy. These narrative and commemorative efforts, in turn, serve as one of the mechanisms linking the revolutionary pathway to democracy to ongoing sociopolitical practices.

## Theoretical Implications

This analysis of democratic practice after a revolution is intended to contribute to theorizing differences among democracies and the historical processes that bring such

systems into existence.<sup>103</sup> The national contrast on which this work has focused proves highly instructive: Portugal's postrevolutionary democratic practice affords to a wide range of political actors a fundamental capacity to achieve a hearing in the nation's institutionally recognized political conversation; whereas in the larger and otherwise quite similar society just across the border, the voices of protesters and the poor are typically kept away from the doings of official institutions. Both Spain and Portugal fully meet the minimal definition of democracy, but they differ with one another in their relative approximation to the principle of full political equality for all citizens in the crucially important processes of agenda setting and public policy formation. This divergence and its consequences for certain societal outcomes hold broad theoretical implications for social scientists and political actors.

I argue that democratic practice in the case of Portugal—and its roots in a social revolution that partially inverted social hierarchies while reconfiguring cultural repertoires—offers us a useful vantage point on processes and outcomes of wide significance, even though few contemporary democracies owe their origins to genuinely social revolutions. At least three cases—France, Nicaragua,<sup>104</sup> and Portugal—appear to belong to this genus, notwithstanding the significant differences among them. In others, such as El Salvador, social revolutionary movements have contributed to constructing the basis for democracy, in part through negotiation. Granted, social revolutions have quite conspicuously not always led to democracy and even where they *have* done so—as in the classic case of France—the ultimate institutionalization of consolidated democratic rule has often followed a more discontinuous historical path than in Portugal.<sup>105</sup> Many recent revolutions that did lead to democracy, such as the cases examined by Mark Thompson,<sup>106</sup> were essentially political affairs, lacking the broad social and cultural dimensions of the national experience examined here. Thus the Portuguese case offers us an exceptional—and recent—opportunity to examine the direct effects of social revolutionary origins on democracy. Moreover, in a much broader set of cases, social pressures from below have contributed decisively to democratization,<sup>107</sup> thus suggesting that the processes identified here hold a relevance that extends beyond the small number of democracies forged in social revolution.

A great corpus of important scholarship has drawn broad theoretical lessons from an examination of the French Revolution and its echoes in subsequent French history.<sup>108</sup> Much work on the French case resonates clearly with this essay's arguments on a more recent instance of democracy born in social revolution. Charles Tilly's sweeping analysis, *The Contentious French*, shows how that country's repertoire of collective action—an important, if partial, component of democratic practice as I understand it—was decisively shaped by revolution. Tilly argues that the great revolution of 1789 created a new repertoire of contention that has allowed "ordinary people [to] fight injustice, challenge exploitation, and claim their place in the structure of power."<sup>109</sup> This repertoire of contention achieved consolidation, Tilly shows, only after the reprise of revolution in 1848, and it has survived in contemporary France. Indeed, French democracy has treated protests of the sort emphasized by Tilly as a routine component of public life. In his analysis of enduring legacies of 1789, George Ross writes, "French society

has seemed both more prone to social movement-style political expression and more prone to granting such expressions unusual legitimacy than other countries.”<sup>110</sup>

Scholars have attributed other features of French politics to the Republic’s revolutionary origins. Cultural sociologist Michele Lamont argues that “one of the keys to French political culture inherited from the French Revolution is the notion that the state treats equally all its members, independently of birth, class, race, or religion.”<sup>111</sup> Rogers Brubaker shows how cultural idioms forged by revolution continue to shape debates—and outcomes—on citizenship.<sup>112</sup>

Central American cases offer further evidence of revolutionary legacies in democratic practice. In Nicaragua, a social revolutionary armed movement ousted Somoza’s “sultanistic” regime and created the basis for a system in which political power has repeatedly changed hands at the ballot box.<sup>113</sup> In neighboring El Salvador, a social revolutionary armed movement underpinned the development of part of the contemporary political spectrum and of the military stalemate that led to a negotiated peace and institutionalized democratic guarantees. In the Salvadoran case, social revolutionary processes prevailed in parts of the national territory, but not in others.<sup>114</sup> Nicaraguan society was more thoroughly remade by the Sandinistas’ triumph. Jocelyn Viterna’s comparative study of the two cases shows the Nicaraguan news media to be substantially more inclusionary in their treatment of protesters—an outcome similar to the case of Portugal.<sup>115</sup> Elisabeth Wood’s analysis of El Salvador shows that in the segments of Salvadoran society touched by the social revolutionary insurgency, the poor gained a new capacity to participate in political life as significant actors. Wood’s work specifies how the insurgency promoted cultural change and developed new forms of practice among previously subordinate actors, which led to what she formulates as the self-reinforcing *pleasure in agency*, facilitating the involvement of the poor in democratic politics.<sup>116</sup> In Central America, as in Europe, where democracy emerged through a social revolutionary process, that historical origin contributed to a form of democratic practice that tends to incorporate the poor and protesters who are located outside institutions as meaningful participants in democratic life.

This claim is not intended to suggest that social revolutionary endeavors offer a viable pathway to enhanced equality in existing democracies that lack such beginnings. The scholarly work on revolutions clearly shows that identifiable conditions render such episodes of rapid and fundamental change likely in some settings and thoroughly unviable in others.<sup>117</sup> Moreover, efforts to pursue revolution in democracies not embedded in such a historical path raise the danger of democratic breakdown highlighted by the scholarship of Juan Linz.<sup>118</sup> Relatively few national cases have opened to them a viable road to democracy strongly similar to that taken by the Portuguese. But where it *is* viable, the social revolutionary path from authoritarianism to democracy holds meaningful implications; and even where it is not viable, it may hold useful lessons for those committed to achieving full political equality among citizens.

Social revolutions give rise to a powerful and distinctive constellation of factors capable of shaping a certain type of democratic practice. However, the processes at work

in revolutions—and in forging their legacies—hold carryover theoretical significance for understanding outcomes in settings characterized by an ensemble of factors lacking the full force of revolution. Crucial to the impact of the revolutionary configuration is the confluence in historical time of the partial inversion of existing hierarchies with the unleashing of new cultural and expressive energies—as well as the rapid accumulation of intense new experiences within a broad sector of the population. The result is the forging of a solid basis for a form of practice—rooted in a synergy between *implicit* and *explicit* cultural foundations—that is more skeptical of hierarchy and more inclusive of the voices of the poor and powerless than are more conventional polities.

A dimension of democratic life emphasized here—that of the relationship between protesters and institutional power holders—has been classically addressed by Gamson, Piven and Cloward, and Tarrow, among others.<sup>119</sup> The scholarly literature on the comparative permeability of institutional power holders to influence emanating from protest in the streets usefully emphasizes the explanatory salience of institutional configurations, resource endowments, and power constellations in accounting for variation in the impact of protest on power holders. This article's examination of postrevolutionary politics, by contrast, underscores the explanatory relevance of another terrain, that of democratic practice itself and of the historical processes that shape it. Much protest and many movements, not only after a revolution but also in polities lacking such origins, seek to remake predominant forms of sociopolitical practice and the culturally rooted understandings of politics associated with them. Theorists such as Alexander, Somers, and others emphasize the contribution of social movements and civil society in opening spaces for new types of citizen involvement in public life.<sup>120</sup> Arguments about who should gain a hearing in democracy's institutionally recognized conversation hold importance in many representative systems.

In a worldwide context of significant—indeed growing—inequality, how and whether democracies can offer meaningful avenues toward political equality among citizens, extending beyond the ballot box itself, stands as one of the greatest questions for the quality of contemporary representative systems. Some democracies benefit from a configuration of organized political and social forces that provides an institutionalized basis for state policies that reduce market-generated inequalities—and for an approach to politics that emphasizes a broad commitment to egalitarian principles. However, only a relatively small number of contemporary democracies enjoy the organizational and institutional conditions needed to approximate full political equality among citizens through the causal avenue followed by social democratic welfare societies.<sup>121</sup> Many more democracies seem destined to find their place, closer or further from the ideal of full citizen equality, precisely on the terrain of democratic practice that differentiates between the neighboring countries of the Iberian Peninsula. The theoretical significance of democratic practice after the revolution in Portugal extends well beyond the small country at the western end of continental Europe where the worldwide turn to democracy of the late twentieth century began.

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## Notes

1. There is a great deal of excellent scholarship on the Portuguese case including Philippe Schmitter, "Liberation By Golpe," *Armed Forces & Society*, 2, no. 1 (1975); Nancy Bermeo, *The Revolution within the Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995); John L. Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Workers' and Neighborhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988); Antonio Costa Pinto, ed., *Modern Portugal* (Palo Alto, CA: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1998); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *O Estado e a Sociedade em Portugal (1974–1988)* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1990); Pedro C. Magalhaes, "Disaffected Democrats: Political Attitudes and Political Action in Portugal," *West European Politics* 28, no. 5 (2005), and "Democratização e independência judicial em Portugal," *Análise Social* 30, no. 139 (1995); Marina Costa Lobo, *Governar em Democracia* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2005); Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Filipe Carreira da Silva, and Tiago Saraiva, eds., *Cidade & Cidadania* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2008); Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Jorge Vala, and André Freire, *Desigualdades Sociais e Percepções de Justiça* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003); José Manuel Sobral, *Trajectos: O Presente e o Passado na Vida de uma Freguesia da Beira* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 1999); Tiago Fernandes, "Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968–1974) in Comparative Perspective," *Democratization* 14, no. 4 (2007); Alan Stoleroff, "Unemployment and Trade Union Strength in Portugal," in *Unemployment in the New Europe*, ed. Nancy Bermeo (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and much additional work, some of it mentioned below.

2. See the important contribution of Peter Hall and Michele Lamont, eds., *Successful Societies* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For a useful discussion on controversies in the definition and conceptualization of culture, see George Steinmetz, "Introduction: Culture and the State," in *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
3. The pioneering theoretical statement is Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also Terry Lyn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (1990); Terry Lyn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 43, no. 2 (1991); Frances Hagopian, "'Democracy by Undemocratic Means'? Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (1990); Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).
4. On this point see Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, *Cooperation without Trust?* (New York: Russell Sage, 2005), chap. 9.
5. Robert Dahl offers a powerful formulation of this problem in *On Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). For work conceptualizing democratic freedom and justice from perspectives highlighting the problem of hierarchies and domination, see Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1997); and Ian Shapiro, *Democratic Justice* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). For a recent theoretical statement on the goal of genuine political equality among citizens see Margaret R. Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6. The literature on the deepening of democracy emphasizes institutional factors in the opening—or closing—of spaces for effective participation by the poor and other socially subordinate sectors but also examines social movements and social pressure from below. See Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance* (London: Verso, 2003); Patrick Heller, "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India," *World Politics* 52, no. 4 (2000); and *The Labor of Development: Workers and the Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala India* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Kenneth M. Roberts, *Deepening Democracy: The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Gianpaolo Baiocchi, *Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in Porto Alegre* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). For analysis incorporating culture and social practice in the examination of popular participation, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ed., *Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Canon* (London: Verso, 2005).

7. I emphasize differences between the two democratization scenarios in Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (1990). See also Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 2 (1987); Rafael Durán Muñoz, *Contención y Transgresión: Las Movilizaciones Sociales y el Estado en las Transiciones Española y Portuguesa* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000); Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Budgets and Democracy: Towards a Welfare State in Spain and Portugal, 1960–1986," in *Developing Democracy*, ed. Ian Budge and David McKay (London: Sage, 1994); Juan Linz, "Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices," in *Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership*, ed. David S. Landes (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977); Jacint Jordana, David Levi-Faur, and Imma Puig, "The Limits of Europeanization: Regulatory Reforms in the Spanish and Portuguese Telecommunications and Electricity Sectors," *Governance* 18, no. 3 (2006); Sebastian Royo, *A New Century of Corporatism?* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); and Sebastian Royo and Paul Christopher Manuel, eds., *Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years* (London: Frank Cass, 2003). Some scholars have preferred to analyze these two cases alongside two other southern European cases, Italy and Greece. From my perspective the two-way comparison of the Iberian neighbors holds advantages for posing certain theoretical questions given the juxtaposition in these two cases of strong structural and historical parallels with one central point of enormous difference, the route taken to democracy. On the southern European cases, see Leonardo Morlino, *Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998); and Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
8. For a comparative argument contending that Central American democracy is an indirect result of revolution, see Jeffrey M. Paige, *Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). For a quite different argument on the historical origins of Central America's regime outcomes, see James Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
9. For an important corrective to the overemphasis of some scholars on the consensual features—and phase—of the Spanish transition, see Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "Consensus and Contention: The Spanish Transition to Democracy Revisited" (paper, Conference on Democracy, Democratization and Social Democracy in Honor of José María Maravall, June 14–15, 2010, Juan March Institute, Madrid). For a classic statement on the interplay in Spain between pressure from below and reform from above, see José María Maravall, *The Transition to Democracy in Spain* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982).
10. On this methodological strategy, see Sidney Tarrow, "The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 2 (2010).

11. That Spain's Second Republic (1931–1939) ended in a bloody civil war lasting from 1936 to 1939 is widely known, but as the scholarship of Kathleen C. Schwartzman, *The Social Origins of Democratic Collapse: The First Portuguese Republic in the Global Economy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989); and Douglas Wheeler, *Republican Portugal: A Political History: 1910–1926* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) has emphasized, Portugal's First Republic was also subject to frequent episodes of violent conflict, political polarization, and contested legitimacy.
12. On the press in the Portuguese First Republic, see Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, 86–87.
13. See Maxwell, *Making of Portuguese Democracy*, for a useful account of these events.
14. This distinction overlaps partially with the contrast I draw between the globalizing discursive horizons of some working-class communities and the defensive localism of others in Robert M. Fishman, *Democracy's Voices: Social Ties and the Quality of Public Life in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
15. Field notes, January 24, 2006, Lisbon.
16. Interview with Timóteo Macedo, leader of Solidariedade Imigrante, April 27, 2006, Lisbon. In order to follow the trajectory of the immigrants' movement I reinterviewed Macedo on February 7, 2008; June 20, 2008; and January 12, 2009.
17. Interview with Mario Soares, June 20, 2008, Lisbon.
18. President Sampaio issued this call in Beja during a visit there in June 2002. See the Internet edition of *Publico* for June 11, 2002, [www.publico.pt](http://www.publico.pt).
19. See *Treinta Anos de Constituição* (Lisbon: Assembleia da República, 2006). In order of the above textual references, see pp. 68, 81, 126, 47, 197, 246, 248.
20. Jeffrey Alexander, *The Civil Sphere* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 296.
21. See Alexander's discussion, *ibid.*, 80–85.
22. This column, which initially appeared in Lisbon's *Diario de Noticias*, is also found in Estrela Serrano, *Para Compreender o Jornalismo* (Coimbra: Minerva, 2006), 193.
23. Interview with Enric Bastardes, July 2, 2008, Barcelona.
24. Field notes, June 7, 2006, Lisbon.
25. Interview with António Luis Marinho, RTP, June 7, 2006, Lisbon.
26. On the significance of José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero's efforts to change the practice of television reporting and the broader efforts of the Zapatero government to transform Spanish politics, see José Luís Martí and Philip Pettit, *A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
27. See the essays in Alfonso Vara Miguel et al., eds., *Cobertura Informativa del 11-M* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2006), as well as Robert M. Fishman, "On Being a Weberian (after Spain's March 11–14): Notes on the Continuing Relevance of Weber's Methodological Approach," in *Max Weber's "Objectivity" Reconsidered*, ed. Laurence McFalls (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); Victor Sampedro Blanco, ed., *Multitudes Online* (Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2005); and Victor Sampedro Blanco, ed., *Medios y Elecciones 2004: La Campaña Electoral y las "otras Campañas"* (Madrid: Editorial Ramon Areces, 2008).
28. Interview with José Manuel Fernandes, June 12, 2006, Lisbon.
29. On these points I am indebted to information provided by Enric Bastardes (interviewed July 2, 2008, Barcelona) and Rodolfo Benito (interviewed May 30, 2008, Madrid).

30. Victor Sampedro Blanco, "Nunca mais: la marea, el dique y el búnquer," in *La Red en la Calle: Cambios en la Movilización. Anuario de Movimientos Sociales 2003*, ed. Elena Grau and Pedro Ibarra (Barcelona: Icaria, 2004); and Victor Sampedro, "The Media Politics of Social Protest," *Mobilization* 2, no. 2 (1997).
31. Jaume Asens, "La Presión al Movimiento de las Okupaciones: Del Apartato Policial a los Mass Media," in *¿Dónde Están las Llamas: El Movimiento Okupa: Prácticas y Contextos Sociales*, ed. Ramón Adell Argilés and Miguel Martínez López (Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2004), 293–338.
32. Among the clearest instances of this tendency was the effort of the PP government to substantially underrepresent the success of a nationwide general strike on June 20, 2002. See the extensive coverage of this matter in *El País* on June 21, 2002.
33. My interviews with local Socialist leaders in industrial towns—discussed in Fishman, *Democracy's Voices*, chap. 6—led to this conclusion.
34. Jeffrey S. Juris, *Networking Futures* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
35. See *Publico*, August 27, 2002, 39 and August 31, 2002, 46.
36. On the *Okupas* in Barcelona, see Asens, "La Presión al Movimiento de las Okupaciones."
37. Interviews with Javi Baeza, January 3, 2009, and May 2008, Madrid.
38. Interview with Joao Ferrao, January 13, 2009, Lisbon. For an external report on government negotiations with the residents of informal housing in Amadora, see Einar Braathen, Elsa Lechner, Marit Ekne Ruud, and Susanne Soholt, *The "Critical Urban Areas" Programme in Portugal—First Assessment* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2008).
39. Interviews with Pedro Soares, January 14, Lisbon, and with Joao Ferrao, January 13, 2009, Lisbon.
40. Interview with Ada Colau and Adrià, militants in the *V de Vivienda* movement, July 16, 2008, Barcelona.
41. Interviews with Timóteo Macedo and Pedro Soares, cited above.
42. Manuel Castells, "The Making of an Urban Social Movement: The Citizens Movement in Madrid toward the End of the Franquist Era," in *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), chap. 5. Castells notes that the Alcalá de Henares movement was characterized by "its almost total lack of achievement in spite of its militancy, mobilization and popular support." *Ibid.*, 248.
43. In the book I am currently writing I take up a broader array of outcomes than is possible here.
44. Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking the Iberian Transformations: How Democratization Scenarios Shaped Labor Market Outcomes," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45, no. 3 (2010).
45. Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economies* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999).
46. Robert M. Fishman and Omar Lizardo, "How Legacies of Macro-political Transformation Shape Patterns of Cultural Taste: The 'Natural Experiment' of Portugal and Spain" (paper, annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 14–17, 2010).
47. Work by Stephen Stoer and our qualitative interviewing of teachers coincide in reaching this conclusion. See Stephen Stoer, *Educação. Estado e desenvolvimento em Portugal* (Lisbon: Horizonte: 1982); and *Educação e mudança social em Portugal* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1986).

48. On the initial preference of the Spanish Socialists to emphasize equality of access rather than cultural transformation, and the embedding of this strategy in the educational pact that formed part of the generally consensual Spanish pathway to democracy, see María Fernández Mellizo-Soto, *Socialismo, Igualdad en la Educación y Democracia: La Experiencia de González y Mitterand* (Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 2001). On educational practice in Spanish schools I rely on qualitative interviews with teachers, discussed in Fishman and Lizardo, “How Legacies of Macro-political Transformation Shape Patterns,” as well as several other sources: Mariano Fernández Enguita, *La Profesión Docente y la Comunidad Escolar: Crónica de un Desencuentro* (Madrid: Ediciones Morata, 1993); Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Pamela O’Malley, eds., *Educational Reform in Democratic Spain* (London: Routledge, 1995); and the OECD survey data reported in *Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS* (Paris: OECD, 2009).
49. Interview with Isabel Guerra, February 8, 2008, Lisbon, and interview with Joao Ferrao, cited above.
50. José Adelantado and Ricard Gomà, “La Política de Vivienda,” in *Cambios en el Estado del Bienestar: Políticas Sociales y Desigualdades en España*, ed. José Adelantado (Barcelona: Icaria, 2000), 313–47.
51. *Ibid.*, 346.
52. For important recent work on this point, see Bonnie Field, “De-Thawing Democracy: The Decline of Political Party Collaboration in Spain (1977 to 2004),” *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 9 (2005): 1079–1103; Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Joan Botella, *Democracy in Modern Spain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004) and the earlier influential work of Josep Maria Colomer, *El arte de la manipulacion politica* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1990).
53. On Bourdieu’s conception of *habitus*, and his theory of practice, see Omar Lizardo, “The Cognitive Origin of Bourdieu’s *Habitus*,” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 34, no. 4 (2004): 375–401, and Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
54. On the concept of *implicit culture*, see Robert Wuthnow and Marsha Witten, “New Directions in the Study of Culture,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 (1998); and Elisabeth Anderson, “Culture as Cause: Methodological Issues in the Study of Culture and Politics” (paper, meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 2007, New York).
55. Omar Lizardo and Michael Strand, “Skills, Toolkits, Contexts and Institutions: Clarifying the Relationship between Different Approaches to Practical Cognition in Cultural Sociology,” *Poetics* 38 (2010): 204–27.
56. See the pioneering theoretical statement by William Sewell Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” *Theory and Society* 25, no. 6 (1996).
57. On fundamental differences between the two democratizing scenarios, see Fishman, “Rethinking State and Regime”; and Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*.
58. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
59. Bermeo, *Revolution within the Revolution*.
60. Hammond, *Building Popular Power*.

61. Durán Muñoz, *Contención y Transgresión*.
62. Diego Palacios Cerezales, *O Poder Caiu na Rua* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003).
63. The most widely viewed retelling of the revolution's story, the movie *Capitães de Abril*, includes a scene, featured in publicity trailers for the film, in which one of the captains insists that at times it is necessary to disobey.
64. Filipe Carreira da Silva and Pedro Magalhaes are currently engaged in research on the origins of the new Constitution.
65. Santos, *O Estado e a Sociedade em Portugal*.
66. Robert M. Fishman, *Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
67. On the re-privatizations see Maria Asensio Menchero, *El Proceso de la Reforma del Sector Público en el Sur de Europa: Estudio Comparativo de España y Portugal* (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 2001).
68. On the purges, see António Costa Pinto, "Settling Accounts with the Past in a Troubled Transition to Democracy: The Portuguese Case," in *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies*, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001); and António Costa Pinto, "Authoritarian Legacies, Transitional Justice and State Crisis in Portugal's Democratization," *Democratization* 12, no. 2 (2006).
69. Costa Pinto, "Authoritarian Legacies," 181.
70. *Ibid.*, 184.
71. Interview with David Rodrigues, February 1, 2008, Lisbon.
72. Interview with José Sobral, June 18, 2008, Lisbon.
73. Manuela Silva et al., *Memórias de Economistas* (Lisbon: Exame, 2006), 105. The interviews with economists collected in this volume serve as a valuable source.
74. See Silva Lopes's commentary on this point in Manuela Silva et al., *Memórias de Economistas*, 53.
75. Diego Palacios Cerezales, *O Poder Caiu na Rua*, offers strong evidence on this point.
76. Among those who have articulated this view is the distinguished legal theorist and politician Gregorio Peces-Barba, who served as the representative of the PSOE on the parliamentary commission drafting the new democratic Constitution before serving as President of the Congreso de los Diputados from 1982 to 1986. I am grateful to Peces-Barba for discussing this and other issues in our interview on May 27, 2009, Universidad Carlos III, Colmenarejo campus, Madrid province.
77. See the discussions in Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*; Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London: Methuen, 1986); and Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, *Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
78. I accept the "Schumpeter-plus" conceptualization of minimal requirements for democracy. On scholarly debates over defining democracy see Ian Shapiro, *The State of Democratic Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
79. Paul Manuel, *Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995); and Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*.

80. Much of this section is based on my field notes from April 25—and the days leading up to it—in 2004 and 2006.
81. On the cultural significance of national commemorations, see Lyn Spillman, *Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
82. Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
83. See the recent formulation on this theme by Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship*, chap. 5.
84. *Diário de Notícias, A Poesia Está na Rua: 25 de Abril. 30 Anos. 100 Cartazes* (Lisbon: *Diário de Notícias*, 2004), 6.
85. José Filipe Costa, *O Cinema ao Poder: A revolução do 25 de Abril e as políticas de cinema entre 1974–1976* (Lisbon: Hugin, 2002).
86. *Diário de Notícias, A Poesia Está*, 20.
87. *Ibid.*, 26.
88. See the work of anthropologist Sónia Vespeira de Almeida, “Campanhas de Dinamização Cultural e Acção Cívica do MFA: uma etnografia retrospectiva,” *Arquivos da Memória* 2, Nova Série (2007).
89. Stephen Stoer, *Educação e mudança social em Portugal: 1970–1980, uma década de transição* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1986), 155.
90. The text of this session of Parliament is available electronically at [www.parlamento.pt](http://www.parlamento.pt).
91. I am grateful to José Soeiro for making available the complete text of the speech.
92. See Gérard Bouchard, “Collective Imaginary and Population Health (How Health Data Can Highlight Cultural History)” in Hall and Lamont, *Successful Societies*.
93. See *25 de Abril, 20 Anos 1974–1994* (Lisbon: Associação 25 de Abril, 1996).
94. Mabel Berezin, in *Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), formulates the concept of nationally specific “consolidation regimes,” which culturally define the relation between a polity and a people. The Portuguese case is characterized, in this sense, by a revolution-based “consolidation regime.”
95. These remarks by Oliveira de Silva, PSD leader in Maia, are available at [www.scribd.com/doc/38862/Discurso-evocativo-do-25-de-Abril](http://www.scribd.com/doc/38862/Discurso-evocativo-do-25-de-Abril) (accessed May 22, 2009).
96. Boaventura de Sousa Santos et al., *25 de Abril: Uma Aventura para a Democracia* (Porto: Afrontamento & Coimbra: Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril, 2004).
97. I am grateful to Pedro Magalhaes and António Costa Pinto for making available the basic findings of this survey.
98. See the important study of Paloma Aguilar, *Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), and the useful recent work of Omar Encarnación, *Spanish Politics: Democracy after Dictatorship* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008).
99. Laura Desfor Edles, *Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 147.
100. Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, “Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7 (2010).
101. On these points see Fishman, “Rethinking State and Regime.”

102. Aguilar, *Memory and Amnesia*.
103. On theorizing differences among democracies, see Guillermo O'Donnell, *Counterpoints* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999) and, by the same author, *Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).
104. Some scholars have classified Nicaragua as a semi-democracy. See Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, "Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic Transitions, Breakdowns and Erosions," in *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, ed. Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14–59.
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106. Mark R. Thompson, *Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2004).
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108. See the important theoretical statements of William Sewell, "Historical Events"; and Aristide Zolberg, "Moments of Madness," *Politics & Society* 2, no. 2 (1972).
109. Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 404.
110. George Ross, "Do Certain Revolutions Promote Certain Kinds of Democracy? Legacies of the French Revolution in Contemporary French Political Culture" (paper, annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 2007, New York), 9.
111. Michele Lamont, "The Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-Racism in France and the United States," in *Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States*, ed. Michele Lamont and Laurent Thevenot (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25–55, 39.
112. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
113. On this regime form, see H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, eds., *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
114. Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
115. Jocelyn Viterna, "Revolutionaries, Politicians, and Revolutionary Politics: The Enduring Legacies of Revolution for Central American Democracies" (paper, annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 2007, New York).
116. Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action*, 234–38.
117. Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

118. Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
119. See William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1975).
120. Alexander, *Civil Sphere*; and Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship*.
121. The classic theoretical statements on this theme by Esping-Andersen and Stephens remain highly relevant for contemporary debates. See Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); John Stephens, *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

## Bio

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